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This is an interesting topic to every jobbing house, and to every
attorney concerned with mercantile collections. The law is pretty
well settled on the general subject and the Treatises on Sales are
plentiful. Among the best is that of Mr. Benjamin. Tiffany on Sales
of the Hornbiook Series recently issued assumes also to state briefly
the principles which control in these cases. At large commercial
and metropolitan points, and among lawyers who have occasion to
often deal with this question, there is perhaps not much difficulty in
arriving at correct conclusions, and promptly enforcing the rights of
a defrauded vendor client. In more restricted localities where
questions of this character arise less frequently, and the test author-
ities are not always accessible, a review of some of the principal
points involved may be of interest, and useful.
Perhaps the most important point at present in dispute may be
stated thus;
Will a fqlse representation by the buyer honestly made, without
knowledge of its falsity and believed to be true, enable the vendor to avoid
a sale, the other- necessary requisites for this purpose being present?
This doctrine was clearly laid down in 1844 in Collins v. Evans,
5 Adolphus & Ellis, p 804, by the Court of Queen's Bench, in an
opinion delivered by Lord Chief Justice Denman. It is there said
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that the allegation in the declaration that defendant knew the
representation to be false, and of which there was no proof, is im-
material. That one of two persons has suffered by the conduct of
the other, and the sufferer is wholly free from blame, but the party
who causes his loss though charged with neither fraud nor negligence
has been guilty of some fault when he made a false representation;
that lie was not bound to make any statement, nor justified in
making any which he did not know to be true; he should therefore
abide the consequences of his misconduct.
This decision seems to be so just and sensible in a civil case
that it is surprising that it did not become established law, whatever
may have been the previous current of authority. It is certain that
it cannot apply to a charge of fraud in a criminal case where there
must be a fraudulent intent to constitute a criminal offense. It. is
difficult however to see why, if a false statement is made by one
party to another, inducing the latter to act, and who thus suffers
damage, lie should not be made whole by the party causing the loss.
It is a course of conduct to which the law ought to attach the con-
sequence of paying such damage as the false statement has occasion-
ed, and indeed it may be said that there is a slight degree of what
may be called moral delinquency.
See observations of Lopes L. J. in Peek v. Derry, 37 Chancery
Division 585.
The term "legal fraud" has been somewhat criticised as we
shall see hereafter, but the courts, and even eminent judges are not
ordinarily guilty of such precision of language as to afford good
grounds for it.
It is true however that this case went to the Exchequer Cham-
ber on error from the Queen's Bench and was reversed the same year
-Evans v. Collins, same volume p. 820. The Court in an opinion
delivered by Tinidal C. J. follows the early case of Pasley v. Freeman,
3 T. R. 51 and declares that the current of authority from that case
downwards, has laid down the general rule of law to be that fraud
must concur with the false statement in order to give a ground of
action; that this doctrine has been upheld by many cases of later
date, referred to in the argument and has been contradicted so far as
the court is aware, by none; there can be no action therefore for
fraud founded upon a false representation unless the party making
it knows'it to be false, and especially if he believes it to be true.
Ilayeraft v. Creasy, 2 East 92.
In Weir v. .Bell L. R. 3 Exeh. Div. p. 238, decided in 1878 on
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appeal from the judgment of the Exchequer Division, Bramwell L.
J. criticises the use of the words "legal fraud" and substantially
holds that there must be moral fraud to make a man liable for fraud
-"I do not understand legal fraud. To my mind it has no more
meaning than legal heat or legal cold, legal light or legal shade.
There never can be a well founded complaint of legal fraud, or of
anything else except where some duty is shown and correlative
right, and some violation of that duty and right. And when these
exist it is much better that they should be stated and acted on, than
that recourse should be had to a phrase illogical and unmeaning
with the consequent uncertainty."
There is ground for saying that the Lord Justice is making too
much of words. As long as the meaning of the words "legal fraud"
is well understood in the profession it is hardly worth discussing
whether some other words may not be more acceptable. The
learned Lord Justice suggests none, unless made into a complete
sentence.
It is very clear that "legal fraud" means fraud in contemplation
of law, and as observed by Mr. Justice Campbell, infra, "these
actions are not brought to teach moral lessons, but to redress actual
grievances."
The question is very elaborately discussed with extended cita-
tions of the English authorities in Joliffe v. Baker, 11 Q. B. Div.,
225, decided in 1883, in which the conclusion is reached that there
is no such thing as "legal" fraud in the absence of moral fraud;
and that a representation believed to be true does not afford a ground
of action.
But these cases are much shaken and severely damaged by the
later case of Peek v. Derry, 37 Ch'y Div., 541; decided in 1887,
wherein Colton, L. J. and Sir J. Hannen and Lopes, L. J. all
comment on "legal fraud-" Lord Justice Colton referring to the
observations of Lord Bramwell appearing above, disclaims entering
into any discussion as to whether legal fraud is a happy expression
and suggests that it is not one which he should adopt, but he con-
tinues; "The question is whether there is not a duty on the part of
those who make statements to be acted upon by others, and whether
there is not a right in these persons to whom the statements are
made. In my opinion there is a duty," p. 567. So also Sir J.
Hannen; "I apprehend it to be the rule of law, that if persons take
upon themselves to make assertions as to which they are ignorant
whether they are true or untrue, they must in a civil point of view,
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be held as responsible as if they had asserted that which they knew
to be untrue," p. 581.
The observations of Lopes, L. J. seem to indicate that there is
no fraud when there is no moral delinquency, but that there is some
slight moral delinquency in making a representation for another to
act upon which the party making it, does not know to be true, and
that it is sufficient to render such a representation fraudulent in
contemplation of law; and he adds; "This is what I understand by
'the expression which is so often used in the authorities, and which
has been referred to by Sir James Hannen; I mean the expression
"legal fraud."
These observations of the learned Justices of the Chancery
Division seem to indicate a drifting back close on to the borders of
the opinion of the Queen's Bench. The remark of Lopes, L. J. is
quite in accord with that of Lord Chief Justice Denman, Supra-
that a party who causes a loss though charged with neither fraud
nor negligence must have been guilty of some fault when he made a
false representation.
This question must be regarded as settled in Michigan. Mr.
Justice Cooley, the learned author of Constitutional Limitations,
speaking from the Supreme Bench in Converse v. Blumrich, 14 Mich.,
108 (1866) ; observes that the courts must look at the effect of un-
true statements upon the person to whom they are made, rather
than to the corrupt moives of the one making them; and that if
one obtains the property of another, by means of untrue statements,
though in ignorance of their falsity, he must be held responsible as
for a legal fraud.
The question has not so often arisen in case of fraud on the
vendor, as of fraud on the vendee. See Ripley v. Case, 86 Mich., 261,
yet in Mooney v. Davis, where the vendor sought to retain the goods
purchased, the court distinctly holds that neither the concealment
or representation need be wilful or intended in order to constitute
the fraud that will vitiate the contract.
In other cases the observations of the learned Justices indicate
that the accepted doctrine is as stated by Mr. Justice Cooley, Stone
v. Covell, 29 MHich., 359 is an action on the case for fraud in making
false representations. Mr. Justice Campbell happily remarks that
these actions are not brought to teach moral lessons, but to redress
actual grievances. When a person sells his property upon the
positive statements of another on facts, and those facts turn out to
be falsely asserted, he is damaged by the falsehood, and the false
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assertion has all the effect of actual fraud.
In that case however the trial court only held the defendant
liable, if he knew or had reason to know or believe, the representa-
tion to be false; without requiring proof of actual knowledge.
In Beebe v. Knapp, 28 Mich., 52, often cited in support of the
doctrine the trial judge in his instructions to the jury held the
defendant liable only in case of an evil intent-if he intended to
deceive the party; but not liable if he made the representations in
the honest believe that they were true.
See also Carter v. Glass, 44 Mich., 154, where Judge Cooley
refers to the case of Beebe v. Knapp as supporting the actionable
character of false representations made by the vendor, though the
vendor was not aware of the falsity of the representations when he
made them; but that case shows as already stated, that the trial
court instructed the jury that there must be an intent to deceive.
Can such an intent be inferred merely from the falsity of representa-
tions not known to be such at the time of making them? Such an
intent is conclusively presumed if the representations are known to
be false. IHudnut v. Gardner, 59 Mich., 841.
In Heineman v. Steiger the defendant denied any wrong intent,
but it appeared that a statement made by him was untrue, and that
was held sufficient, 54 Mich., 232. In Hudnut v. Gardner, supra,
the defendant had knowledge of the falsity of the representation. It
is quite apparent that the doctrine laid down by Judge Cooley in
Converse v. Blumrich, supra, is the accepted law of Michigan, and
will be enforced in all cases when applicable.
The question can hardly be said to be settled in the Federal
Courts. The case of Southern Developement Co, v. Silva, 125 U. S.,
247, decided in 1887, seems to support the doctrine that there must
be knowledge of the falsity of the representations to constitute fraud.
The transaction involved the sale of a mine and the facts were some-
what peculiar, and the action was in equity.
In an earlier case of Turner v. Ward involving a sale of personal
property, where the question is distinctly raised, it is held in an
opinion delivered by Chief Justice Waite that the representations
were sufficient to set aside the sale as induced by false representa-
tions, although the defendant had himself been deceived as to the
pecuniary condition of the firm and made the representations
honestly and in the belief that they were true.
This case though decided in 1876 is only recently reported in
Appendix 154 U. S., 618, 14 S. C. R., 1179.
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Perhaps the weight of authority is against the Michigan doctrine,
but it would seem that the tendency of later decisions is in its favor
as supported by the better reasoning. It certainly ought to secure a
firm lodgement in those jurisdictions where the question has not
been already decided adversely.
